BICOM

Key points

• Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah made a rare public appearance on Tuesday 6 December, reaffirming his support for the embattled Syrian regime, and promising that his movement’s armed forces were stronger than ever. But behind this defiant stance, the movement faces serious challenges as a result of the Syrian uprising.
• The Assad regime is a key conduit for arms supplies to Hezbollah. Assad’s influence in Lebanon also enables Hezbollah to maintain its independent military infrastructure. Were Assad to fall, all of this would be likely to change.
• Hezbollah’s activities against Syrian oppositionists in Lebanon and vociferous support for Assad are harming Hezbollah’s carefully crafted image as a champion of Arab peoples against unrepresentative rulers.
• Hezbollah and Syria are vital tools for Iran to project its influence into the Arab world and to threaten Israel’s borders. Should Assad fall, it would represent a major loss for the Iran-led bloc in general.
• Hezbollah has been effectively deterred from attacking Israel since 2006. However, given the high stakes involved, the possibility of Hezbollah raising tensions with Israel, as a means to divert attention from the pressure on Assad, cannot be ruled out.

Why is Hezbollah concerned about events in Syria?

Hezbollah, which is the dominant force in the Lebanese government, has perhaps the largest stake in the survival of the Assad regime of any regional element, other than Assad himself. Why is this and how is Hezbollah seeking to respond to this threat?

Syria played a key role in facilitating Hezbollah’s growth from a sectarian militia into a formidable political and paramilitary force. Damascus, on the commencement of its occupation of Lebanon in 1990, disarmed all militias with the exception of Hezbollah, permitting the movement to continue attacks on Israeli forces in the south. Hezbollah is primarily a client of Iran with whom it shares a radical Shia Islamist ideology. But Syria, as the only Arab state allied with Iran and the dominant power in Lebanon from 1990 to 2005, has been vital in facilitating Hezbollah’s growth. Damascus allowed Hezbollah to train and store weaponry within Syria. The Syrian capital also served as the key conduit for Iranian weaponry on its way to Hezbollah.

Following the Syrian departure from Lebanon in 2006, Hezbollah, working with Syria’s allies in the Shia and Christian communities, moved to secure control of the reins of government in Lebanon. This process culminated in January 2011, when the pro-western and pro-Saudi March 14 movement withdrew from the government, leaving Hezbollah and its allies ruling the country alone.

During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria served as Hezbollah’s strategic hinterland. The movement was able to bring supplies across the border and evacuate wounded fighters, knowing that if Israel interfered with this process, it would have risked war between Syria and Israel. Since 2006, Syria has been a key staging point for Iranian weaponry as Hezbollah has rearmed.

Given the importance of Syria to Hezbollah, the events in Syria are putting increasing pressure on the movement. Around 4,000 people have been killed by the Assad regime in the wave of protests that have swept the country. With the opposition increasingly organised and armed, the situation is moving towards that of a civil war.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, out of strategic necessity remains staunchly on the side of the regime. This is having a negative effect on perceptions of the movement both in Syria and in the wider region. Hezbollah tries to present itself as a movement of muqawama (resistance) in the Middle East, representing the supposedly shared interests of Arab and Muslim peoples against the US, Israel and their allies.

Today, however, Hezbollah is openly allied with a sectarian, Iran-aligned, non-Sunni regime which is engaged in the savage repression of its own, mainly Sunni Arab people. Such a situation represents a disaster for the image Hezbollah wants to project.

Should Assad eventually fall, he would likely be replaced by a regime dominated by the country’s Sunni Arab majority, which constitute 60-65% of Syria’s population. They are dominant in the ranks of the uprising and in the leadership of the Syrian National Council (SNC), the main opposition coalition. A Sunni-dominated Syria would likely seek new alliances for the country, away from the Iran. For example, SNC leader Burhan Ghalioun said last week that an SNC-ruled Syria would work to rebuild links with Egypt and the key Arab countries of the Gulf, as opposed to Iran.

Such a scenario is of deep concern to Hezbollah, since it could significantly alter the balance of power in Lebanon between the movement and its more pro-Western March 14 rivals. March 14 is dominated by the Mustaqbal (Future) movement of former prime minister, Sunni leader Saad Hariri. A Sunni-dominated Syria, with natural links to Sunni forces in Lebanon, would radically shift the internal balance of power in its smaller neighbour.

This change could jeopardise Hezbollah’s ability to preserve its independent military infrastructure and freedom to take military action against Israel without consulting with other Lebanese elements. Hezbollah’s independent armed forces are key to its power within Lebanon. When aspects of its independent military and decision-making capacity were challenged in 2008, it was prepared to use violence within Lebanon to force its opponents to back off. But with a Sunni regime in Syria, Hezbollah’s ability to intimidate its domestic opponents may be undermined. Within Lebanon itself, the Syrian situation is already leading to increased polarisation. Last week, a rejuvenated March 14 movement held a mass rally in the northern Lebanese, Sunni town of Tripoli where anti-Hezbollah and anti-Syrian banners were flown.

How is Hezbollah responding?

Syrian opposition elements maintain that Hezbollah members have been actively supporting Assad’s efforts to crush the revolt. Little proof has yet emerged to back up these claims. However, there are credible reports that Hezbollah is cooperating with the Lebanese security forces in apprehending Syrian opposition activists on Lebanese soil and returning them to Syria.

The Lebanese government, itself dominated by Hezbollah, is cooperating with Damascus in trying to contain the Syrian regime’s crisis. In regional diplomacy the Lebanese government remains opposed to Arab League sanctions against Syria. It is unclear if Lebanon will simply ignore the sanctions. There is also suspicion that the Lebanese banking sector may be used to circumvent the sanctions. This could lead to punitive action against the Lebanese banking sector by major Arab countries. However, the financial sector is the backbone of the Lebanese economy, and this could significantly harm Lebanon’s internal economic situation.

The situation in Syria is also beginning to threaten Hezbollah’s internal political standing in Lebanon. The March 8 coalition, of which it is a part, depends for its parliamentary majority on the support of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Often seen as the ‘weathervane’ of Lebanese politics, Jumblatt has begun to criticise Syrian internal repression.

Hezbollah has also been forced to accept a compromise on funding the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is seeking those responsible for the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. In late June, the tribunal sought four Hezbollah members in connection with the killing. Hezbollah quickly announced that the men would never be apprehended. Despite this strong opposition, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Najib Mikati remained committed to providing funding for the tribunal, and in the end Hezbollah accepted a compromise, as it was not willing to risk a crisis in the coalition.

What are the implications for Israel?

Israel has no influence over internal events in Syria or Lebanon. Its interest is in a quiet northern border. For as long as Hezbollah is able to maintain its independent military infrastructure in Lebanon, the threat of an attack on Israel remains. Hezbollah has extensively rearmed to recoup the losses it incurred in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. It is now estimated to have an arsenal of 40,000 rockets, including precision guided missiles that can reach all parts of Israel. It has also deliberately deployed its weapons in villages to make them harder for Israel to target in any future conflict.

Whilst the situation in Syria may be putting Hezbollah under pressure, no immediate threat to Hezbollah’s military infrastructure currently exists. However, should Assad fall, this would represent a major loss for the Iran-led bloc in general, and for Hezbollah in particular. It would deprive Hezbollah of its key local backer, the principle conduit for its weapons supplies and the guarantor of its unique status in Lebanon. It would no longer be able to rely on Syria’s cooperation during any future conflict with Israel.

In the short term, however, there is the possibility of Hezbollah raising tensions with Israel, as a means to divert attention from the pressure on Assad, or to widen the circle of conflict. Hezbollah has been effectively deterred from attacking Israel following the damage it incurred during the Second Lebanon War. Nonetheless, the stakes for Hezbollah are very high. In a televised speech on 11 November, Nasrallah threatened that, ‘a war on Iran and Syria will not be confined to these two states but will spread to other countries in the region’. The possibility of Syria and Hezbollah trying in some way to widen the conflict, therefore, cannot be ruled out.